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Critical race and neo-Marxist perspectives treat rights or 
“rights discourse” with a somewhat similar and complex 
ambivalence, but with distinctly different weightings and 
emphases in how they theorize rights functioning within systems 
of liberal democracy and racialized capitalism.  On the one hand, 
both approaches identify a subject formation function1 of liberal 
rights discourse that may be informed by dominant ideology—
racialized in the case of critical race theory (CRT) and disciplinary 
or abstract universalist2 in the case of neo-Marxism.  On the 
other hand, this scholarship acknowledges a politically 
progressive or liberatory subject-formation and equalizing/ 
redistributive function by which rights discourse may potentially 
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1  The notion of “subject formation” suggests the importance of 
power and social processes, including law, in effecting human subjects and 
subjectivity.  See, e.g., ALAN HUNT AND GARY WICKHAM, FOUCAULT AND 
LAW:  TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF LAW AS GOVERNANCE 28-29 (1994) 
(explaining the claim that social processes “give rise to subjectivity,” which 
results from a combination of individual agency and “outside” power). 
2  Abstract universalist conceptions of rights may be thought of as 
those that propound an imaginary equality under law as a universal condition 
of citizenship in liberal democratic states.  Critics view such conceptions as 
abstracting from the material inequality and exclusions of civil society.  
Disciplinary conceptions of the subject formation function see rights as, in 
part, reinforcing the subject formation processes that modern disciplinary 
societies rely upon for maintenance of order and hierarchy.  See Kenneth 
Baynes, Rights as Critique and the Critique of Rights:  Karl Marx, Wendy Brown, and 
the Social Function of Rights, 28 POL. THEORY 451, 453-57 (2000) (discussing 
disciplinary and abstract universalist problems identified from left, or what the 
author refers to as, “neo-Marxist” perspectives). 
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ground resistance and transformation.
3
  Almost no one writing 
from  these traditions is likely either to categorically deny the 
desirable and defensible political possibilities that attach to rights 
or to celebrate rights as the necessary and sufficient guarantor of 
universal equality and justice.
4
  
This Essay considers the possibility of a political and 
dialectical theory of rights that builds on these critical traditions 
through revision of formal Marxian approaches and in light of 
racialized forms of accumulation and anti-systemic struggle.  This 
Essay borrows from the CRT and neo-Marxist traditions in 
arguing for the centrality of both political contestation and 
structural economic-materialist conditions in forging a 
progressive politics of rights.  This can be contrasted to a critique 
of human rights in the international context that sees the 
discourse itself as depoliticizing insofar as rights become the 
prime possession of those who are denied a political space in 
which to assert their claims.  The metaphor of rights 
(re)territorialization captures these concerns, while foregrounding 
the ongoing importance of race in grounding various aspects of 
global capital accumulation and concomitant political formations. 
If there are poles in this discursive field, CRT has come 
to represent the positive subject formation and emancipatory 
meanings of rights in the context of the Civil Rights Struggle and 
racial formation generally.  But CRT is also the source of an 
intersectionality critique that identifies problems of white-
normative racial subjectification at work in some areas of rights 
protection.
5
  CRT has also challenged a fundamental liberal rights 
shibboleth with its critique of property that traces the mutually 
constituting relationship between race and property.
6
  These CRT 
                                                                                                       
3  See, e.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND 
RIGHTS 149 (1991) (arguing that rights have been an “effective form of 
discourse for Blacks” despite not being ends in themselves). 
4  Such nuanced race conscious and neo-Marxist understandings of 
rights differ from either so-called racialist or economically deterministic 
approaches that are said to essentialize rights and the rule of law generally to 
some form of instrumental function, perhaps masking but always “serving” 
white or, alternatively, capitalist interests.  For use of the term racialist, see 
Introduction, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT HAVE 
FORMED THE MOVEMENT xiii, xxi (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).  
5  See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:  Intersectionality, Identity 
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991). 
6  Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1710 
(1993).  
 




positions theorize rights as political while using a recent historical 
cases as sources of practical insight, and in the sense of ferreting 
out the particularistic content of rights (the white content of 
property rights, for example).  These are aspects of critical race 
theory that are different from concerns about the formal 
constraints of rights (as derived from an underlying set of social 
relations) or their indeterminacy.   
Neo-Marxists, in a much more luke-warm relationship 
with rights, retain the core of a formalist critique of liberal rights, 
insofar as rights are understood to reflect the ideology and 
structure of the commodity form.7  A subject formation process, 
foreshadowed by Marx’ distinction between two types of rights 
subject (bourgeois and citizen), now reacting also to the demands 
of a depoliticized and disciplinary framework under (neo)liberal 
democratic capitalism, Empire, etc. may overwhelm the political 
meaning and domain of rights.  And if depoliticization through 
civil rights might be a problem “within” democratic polities, 
consider the consequences of this kind of analysis for human 
rights—deterritorialized and thus existing everywhere, but in a 
sense demarking a political nowhere.8  
Marx saw the commodity form as a mystification of the 
unequal social relations of production in capitalism.9  But the 
commodity form comes itself to represent a kind of mystifying, 
bifurcated thinking about political economy—the move of 
deriving a general form from specific content.  And, indeed, we 
should ask to what extent Marx’ notion of the commodity form 
may fail to capture fully the underlying content (here, the social 
relations of production under varying conditions of capitalist 
accumulation).  The commodity form never was intended to 
represent the whole of capitalist accumulation and is less likely to 
                                                                                                       
7  See Karl Marx, Capital, Volume One, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 
294, 320 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1972).  For Marx, the commodity form in 
capitalism served to mask the social relations of production (labor and class 
relations) behind an abstract form of those production processes: the 
commodity; see also Baynes, supra note 2 (discussing the left’s critique and 
partial embrace of rights). 
8  See Jacques Rancière, Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?, 103 S. 
ATLANTIC Q. 297 (2004); see also Slovoj Žižek, Against Human Rights, 34 NEW 
LEFT REV. 115 (2005).  
9  See Marx, supra note 7 (discussing how the commodity form masks 
social relations of production in an apparently objective entity, the 
commodity). 
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do so under late or postmodern, post-industrial, globalized 
capitalism.  Rights, therefore, should be theorized politically and 
dialectically in relation to forms and processes characteristic of 
the current “conjuncture” of capital accumulation (displacing, 
dispossessive, neoliberal, globalized, imperial, racialized, 
gendered, etc.).  Moreover, resistances to these particular forms 
and processes may bring together, under the rights discourse, 
elements of political economy, political contestation and subject 
formation process.10 
Of course, definitively tying the meaning and critical 
evaluation of rights and rights discourse to underlying 
“movements” (organized collective subject positions under 
mobilization) that demand rights recognition assumes, and in 
some sense should be required to theorize, how rights (and the 
underlying movements) matter politically and dialectically.  That 
is, that rights and their political meaning amount to something 
more than a certain dead-end, seducing through the ruse of 
universalist legal reason.  In its stronger form, the argument 
might be that somehow rights and movements may mutually 
constitute one another and form part of a dialectic within 
capitalism that grounds political challenge in response to certain 
contexts and conjunctures within broader systems of power and 
accumulation.  Without a relatively strong connection between 
rights and movements, rights might seem merely an optional or 
sometimes even negative feature of movement formation, and 
their meaning not linked “formally” to anti-systemic social or 
political action.  This latter linkage requires explaining how social 
movements may actually be anti-systemic (i.e., in traditional 
                                                                                                       
10  I was recently compelled to grapple with my own critical 
understanding of rights in response to a simple-sounding question that arose 
in a class on social movements.  A student asked whether civil rights and 
human rights were not really just different names for the same thing , with the 
label of human rights being used mainly in “other countries” and civil rights 
more commonly used in the United States.  The “organic” impromptu answer 
I wish I had given would have focused on the differences and similarities 
between civil rights and human rights based on characteristics of the 
“underlying” movements themselves and the socio-political goals those 
movements sought to achieve, and against which kinds of inequality and 
exclusion they struggled etc.  I instead alluded generally to the substantive 
differences between human rights treaty law and statutory civil rights law and, 
thus, contributed to the process of abstraction.  The preferred answer would 
have given the students an analytic of some practical and normative value in 
thinking about the meaning of rights as they operate within contexts of 
political struggle under conditions of globalizing capital accumulation.  
 




Marxist terms) and how they relate to the overarching project of 
political and even human emancipation.  
Slavoj Žižek grapples with these questions in a piece he 
somewhat misleadingly entitles “Against Human Rights” (since in 
the end, Žižek seems to support a possible counter-hegemonic 
function for a converted or perverted form of human rights 
discourse, along the lines of indigenous appropriation and 
recirculation of Christian cultural forms).11  Žižek, drawing 
directly from Marx, critiques the abstract universalist form human 
rights assume under global capitalism by tying this form to the 
increasingly all-encompassing system of global commodity 
exchange.12  Žižek identifies a dual negative effect of human 
rights discourse in the simultaneous depoliticization (removal of 
people’s claims from the political realm) and renaturalization (e.g., 
culturalization or ethnicization) of conflict that occurs under the 
hegemonic influence of abstract universalism.13  For Žižek, 
abstract universalism and essentialization of political difference 
(reduced through mystification to naturalized differences of 
“culture”) are suited counterparts to a world organized 
conceptually and materially according to the logic of commodity 
exchange.14  Žižek, following Rancière, understands the universal 
“rights of man” or human rights (as distinguished from the rights 
of citizens or perhaps “civil rights”) as representing something 
more than the problem of reification of exploitative social 
relations that Marx identified.15  Rather, the idea of human rights 
presupposes the complete negation of politics and grounds the 
law and politics-defeating assertion of a realm of Manichean and 
self-serving ethics.  This concept was captured, for example, in 
the Bush administration’s post-9/11 rhetoric of “infinite justice” 
and “good” versus “evil.”16  We speak of people possessing 
“universal human rights” usually in those contexts where the 
people have, in fact, no rights and no way to assert rights.  For 
these thinkers the problem of human rights lies in how they 
                                                                                                       
11  See generally Žižek, supra note 8.  




16  Rancière, supra note 8, at 309.  
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negate the basis of real politics, law, and perhaps, even the 
possibility of political subjecthood itself.17  
Marx and Pashukanis famously looked at liberal (or 
bourgeois) rights as standing in a direct and mutually constituting 
relationship with the commodity form of exchange under 
capitalism—taken to be the system’s elemental or signature 
economic form, through which social relations of production are 
given a mystifying, objective form (reification and the ontology of 
relations among things).18  But Marx also critiqued rights 
consciousness as a quasi-religious formation, requiring and 
producing alienated, abstractly equal and free (or sovereign) 
subjects who were, in fact, cut off from each other and their own 
species or social “nature” through the abstraction.  Taking 
seriously the possibility of linkages between rights and an 
underlying “economic form” may appear objectionably 
deterministic and reductionist.  But, the possibility of some kind 
of “formal” or structural understanding of the sort seems hard to 
separate from the possibility of rights consciousness being a 
factor either for, against, or even apart from, the pseudo-closures 
of bourgeois ideology, ontology, or disciplinary subject 
formation.19  Moreover, there is a tension to be explained 
between the Left’s theorizing rights as formally, ideologically or 
ontologically antithetical toward a transformative emancipatory 
project of equality and sociability through progressive political 
action and political subjecthood formation, and many leftists 
writers’ political support or at least restrained ambivalence toward 
rights discourse.  
Indeed, Marx gave his political support to the liberal 
rights-based pursuit of a merely “political” (not “human”) form 
of emancipation as a stage in the progressive overcoming of 
alienation under capitalism.20  Today, it is hard to find a left critic 
                                                                                                       
17  See also Wendy Brown, Suffering the Paradox of Rights, in LEFT 
LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 420, 420-34 (Wendy Brown et al. eds., 2002) 
[hereinafter LEFT LEGALISM]. 
18  For a masterful recent application, defense and extension of 
commodity theory that has greatly informed my thinking about both Marx and 
Pashukanis, see CHINA MIÉVILLE, BETWEEN EQUAL RIGHTS: A MARXIST 
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). 
19  See generally Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Legal Studies, 
in LEFT LEGALISM, supra note 17, at 178 (discussing the role of “rights 
consciousness” from a critical legal studies perspective). 
20  See Shlomo Avineri, Marx and Jewish Emancipation, 25 J. HIST. IDEAS 
445 (1964) (explaining Marx’s support for Jewish emancipation despite his 
 




of rights (even including the more suspect arena of human rights) 
who believes that the pursuit of movement-driven rights agendas 
is or has been politically undesirable or even theoretically 
indefensible.  As theorist Costas Douzinas puts it in his book The 
End of Human Rights, the critical project should work toward a 
demythologized understanding of rights that reassesses “their 
promise away from the self-satisfied arrogance of states and 
liberal apologists and attempt[s] to discover political strategies 
and moral principles that do not depend exclusively on the 
universality of law, the archaeology of myth and the imperialism 
of reason.”21 
The commodity-form way of looking at rights 
underwrites both a materialist and idealist story in the sense that 
it seeks the secret of rights, like that of commodities, in the 
ideological work of a form that is shaped dialectically through a 
particular kind of material social content: the relations of 
production under capitalism.  Liberal rights systems were seen by 
Marx to function at the public level of the state/citizen culturally 
(like religion), while also instantiating capitalist social relations 
through their construction of private civil society.  Rights are the 
legal form in which we experience and misapprehend our 
alienation under social relations that are hidden but embodied in 
the commodity form.  But even beyond what Marx and 
Pashukanis sketched, the “realm” of commodity exchange 
suggests a socially and psychologically dense terrain that calls for 
different ways of theorizing politics and law on the ever-shifting 
and potentially “semi-autonomous” social grounds of circulation 
and exchange.  Indeed, the commodity form was only ever meant 
to represent the pure (and egalitarian) logic of capitalist exchange 
(borrowed, in fact, from the classical liberal economists of the 
turn of the eighteenth century), but not constituting in any sense 
a statement of the entire logic of capitalist society, as Marxism 
has always taken capitalism to be a mix of accumulative forms 
and relations.  More precisely, the mode of production Marxists 
refer to as capitalism is really better understood as a changing and 
uneven set of processes of capitalist accumulation, evincing both 
historical contingency and path dependency.  Miéville captures 
                                                                                                       
critique of mere “political” emancipation under liberal or bourgeois rights 
regimes generally, as conveyed in the essay “On the Jewish Question”). 
21  COSTAS DOUZINAS, THE END OF HUMAN RIGHTS:  CRITICAL 
LEGAL THOUGHT AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY 8 (2000).  
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the dynamic interpenetration between contingent commercial and 
imperial forms of accumulation and forms of law by a reading of 
Pashukanis that places Roman imperial commercial relations at 
the origin point of the modern legal form itself–economically 
oriented engagements among nominally equal and independent 
or “free” subjects (of the empire).22  
What this suggests is how Left thinking about rights 
might contribute to conscious synthesis of critical race and semi-
formalist Left accounts of political economy that give important 
context to the meaning of rights struggles and rights 
consciousness.  If race is, among other things, a category of 
capitalism, then its “reality” may be best understood as in part 
akin to the pseudo-reality of Marx’s commodity form.23  Race 
may serve as a form that both embodies and hides through 
reification (as natural, biological, cultural, etc.) of social relations 
under capitalism.  Indeed, “imperial encounters” betray how race 
operates as an almost ideal social signifier within overlapping 
systems of power that utilize both sovereign powers of exclusion 
(force, possession, control) and disciplinary powers (governance, 
education, uplift, development, etc.).24  Grappling with the myriad 
ways of understanding how race and economics, like law and the 
commodity form,25 mutually constitute one another may not 
generate an exact logic through which dialectically to analyze 
rights as a legal form.  Theorizing race and capitalism has 
occurred, nonetheless, for example, through anti-colonial 
revolutionary interventions that brought together an 
understanding of capitalism, racism and imperialism.  In doing so, 
this thinking departs from Lenin’s systemic notion of intra-
imperial rivalry in moving toward an understanding of 
dispossessive, colonial capitalism that relies on a splitting of 
society along racial lines.  These half-century old approaches 
retain their appeal, as evidenced by the enduring popularity of 
                                                                                                       
22  MIÉVILLE, supra note 18, at 130-31. 
23  Harry Chang originates this approach, according to the 
posthumous reconstruction of his work and influence.  See Bob Wing, Harry 
Chang:  A Seminal Theorist of Racial Justice, 58 MONTHLY REV., Jan. 2007, at 23, 
29, available at http://www.monthlyreview.org/0107wing.htm.  
24  ROXANNE LYNN DOTY, IMPERIAL ENCOUNTERS:  THE POLITICS 
OF REPRESENTATION IN NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS 62 (1996). 
25  See Marx, supra note 7, at 320 (asserting that the commodity is “a 
mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of men’s labour 
appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that 
labour . . . .”). 
 




Fanon who writes of stretching Marxist analysis of the colonial 
problem where:  “The cause is the consequence; you are rich 
because you are white, you are white because you are rich.”26  
Marx famously never returned with sustained attention to 
his early-phase formalist critique of rights, and indeed it may be 
quixotic to look for an essential “nature” in capitalism that 
generates homologous legal forms or that violates some aspect or 
another of our social nature.  But we can and should consider 
how observable and theoretically understood accumulation 
processes relate to raced social hegemony, for example, in the 
shaping and function given to surplus or reserve populations of 
labor under globalization.27  It is apparent that race can be shown 
to function as a kind of semi-autonomous political and 
economically consequential “system of inequality,” which infuses 
capitalism with specific shape and dynamics, or that capitalism is 
inseparable as a historical system from the inequality created 
through race.  This may be seen through the fundamental roles 
played by slavery, colonialism and imperialism in the modern 
history of accumulation.  We then should ask how such non-
commodity but nonetheless capitalist forms—those based on 
race and dispossessive logic, for example—might be reflected or 
represented through a legal form such as rights in their 
relationships to social conflict.   
Alan Hunt admonishes Marxist legal theory to look to the 
forms of social conflict in capitalist societies to best understand 
how legal forms relate to projects of transformation (or 
retrenchment).28  Hunt wants us to inquire into the forms of 
social conflict under capitalism and has researched the 
relationship between social movements and rights under 
hegemonic social conditions.29  This way of theorizing rights 
works from social conflict that can be said to reflect the contours 
of (raced) accumulationist patterns, constructed and resisted 
through normative (including rights) discourse that shapes a field 
of conflict between dissenting group-based movements and some 
                                                                                                       
26  FRANTZ FANON, WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 40 (1963). 
27  See Michael McIntyre, Race, Surplus Population, and the Marxist Theory 
of Imperialism, 43 ANTIPODE 1489 (2011). 
28  Alan Hunt, Marxist Legal Theory and Legal Positivism, 46 MOD. L. 
REV. 236, 241-42 (1983). 
29  See Alan Hunt, Rights and Social Movements: Counter-Hegemonic 
Strategies, 17 J. L. & SOC’Y 309 (1990). 
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semi-closed notion of the majority.  These have been and 
continue to be movements for inclusion, movements, as 
Wallerstein says, to expand the democratic majority—the 
currently hegemonic way of imagining legitimate political 
community.  Wallerstein views rights-based and other 
movements of group-based inclusion as an indispensable part of 
a progressive strategy for the foreseeable future, suggesting the 
centrality of a movement-oriented analysis of rights discourse.30 
In the face of a depoliticizing abstract universalism, how 
might we understand a project to repoliticize/denaturalize 
conflict (in Žižek’s terms), and redeem the possibility of 
transformative politics and historical subjecthood?  CRT 
theorizes rights and politics from a “place in the world” of 
political subjecthood. Marxism provides an impetus to think 
dialectically about rights in light of patterns and systems of 
accumulation.  Everyone who works critically on race and law can 
benefit by addressing these polarities.  
Marxism pushes us to think dialectically about how social 
and legal processes like the securitization of race and racialization 
of security relate to the (de)territorialized processes of globalizing 
capitalist accumulation.  We should expect to understand rights 
best as discourse or legal form dialectically, contingent upon 
these processes but also (re)constituting them and (re)articulating 
their sociality.  For the mid-term, it would seem rights may be 
expected to retain linkages to the reterritorializations of politics 
that follow from race-based or peoples-based movements for 
inclusion and equality.  How those political “forms” relate to the 
systems of accumulation is itself a dialectical question that will be 
answered “formally” only through an appreciation that social 
conflict is the process through which political meaning is created 
from an accumulationist and disciplinary substrate.  The key to 
understanding how such legal-political  paradoxes are resolved is 
to see intervention and violence both as constitutive of law and 
as fundamental to existing and ascendant forms of accumulation.  
Beyond just the problem of rights “embourgeoisement” under 
the rubric of universal rights of man (per Marx), the new (post-
1960’s) human rights rights-forms may hide and, thus, contribute 
to modern relations of global capitalist domination and 
                                                                                                       
30  See Immanuel Wallerstein, Remembering Andre Gunder Frank While 
Thinking About the Future, 60 MONTHLY REV., June 2008, at 50, 58, available at 
http://www. monthlyreview.org/080630wallerstein.php.  
 




imperialism. Under such circumstances, all manner of 
“humanitarian” intervention, but also unapologetic national 
security hypertrophy, should be seen less as violations of the 
principle of state sovereignty, or assertions of the right of the 
powerful to exercise violence with impunity, but instead as the 
affirmation of a basic communitarian ethical point of origin to be 
asserted/defended almost religiously (as naturally “consensual”) 
by its interventionist champions.31  This masking of real relations 
of capital imperialism, in turn, becomes a mechanism for 
deepening and extending those relations.  
One can learn from the democratic movements that have 
recently shaken the foundations of global order in countries such 
as Tunisia and Egypt.  While it is still too soon to tell what kinds 
of lasting changes may come from these movements, what is 
clear is how protestors mobilized behind ideas of freedom and 
political rights discourse.  In addition, however, these movements 
deployed those ideas and discourse as part of an anti-imperialist 
politics and ethic.  The protestors demanded both political rights 
and the dignity of economic subjecthood, the ability to live 
without the stresses of basic food and shelter insecurities.  These 
rights-based movements were quite material in that they grew not 
from a professional, international class of human rights 
technocrats, but from the novel and unprecedented demands of 
rights-bearers themselves.  Moreover, we should not assume 
these movements fit neatly into western categories as they have 
retained their local and cultural specificity (“Arab,” “Islamic,” 
Egyptian, etc.).  Calls from western political leaders and human 
rights groups for democracy and political freedom in the Arab 
world seem beside the point of these highly territorialized efforts 
to marshal rights discourse for social transformation.  
 
                                                                                                       
31  See Rancière, supra note 8, at 308-09. 
